AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF HONEYBEE POLLINATION MARKETS by Rucker, Randal R. et al.
An Empirical Analysis of Honeybee Pollination Markets
by
Randal R. Rucker
Department of Agricultural Economics and Economics
Montana State University
Walter N. Thurman
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics






Prepared for presentation at the August, 2001 meetings of the American Agricultural Economics
Association in Chicago, Illinois     
1 See Muth and Thurman (1995) for a critique of these estimates. 
     
2 Siebert (1980) discusses pesticide use in California agriculture and its bee mortality effects, which




Pollination services provided by beekeepers represent an important input into the
production of many U.S. agricultural commodities.  Arguments made in Congressional
subcommittee hearings in recent years suggest that the value of these services may be as high as
$9 billion (see Robinson et al., 1989).  Recent updates to that figure (see Morse and Calderone)
peg the value at $14.6 billion in 1999 dollars.  While these estimates almost certainly are greatly
overstated,
1 there is no doubt that the pollination services provided by beekeepers are extremely
important for the production of certain crops.  Given this importance, it is surprising that little
economic analysis of pollination markets has been undertaken.  
To our knowledge, publications on the workings of pollination markets are just three:
Cheung (1973), Johnson (1973), and Olmstead and Wooten (1987).
2  Cheung’s 1973 paper
recounted the history of what he termed "the fable of the bees" in economic thought.  Pigou
(1912 and 1920) is credited with first discussing the divergence between private and social cost,
but the popularization of the notion in the economic literature is credited to Meade (1952) whose
central, and fictional, example is one of an apple farmer and a beekeeper.  He describes a
situation where beekeeping and apple farming occur side by side, apple blossom nectar provides
food for the bees, and bee pollination increases the yield of apples.  The stipulated fact that the
apple farmer and beekeeper do not transact implies an externality and an under provision of both2
nectar and pollination. 
The central point made by both Cheung and Johnson is that the stipulated facts (and
therefore the claim of externalities) described by Meade and later by Bator (1958) are
fictional—there are, in fact, well-developed markets in which beekeepers and growers of
pollination-requiring and nectar-producing crops transact regularly.  Cheung examines the market
for bee services and nectar in Washington state, analyzing data from a small number of
beekeepers in 1971.  He concludes that the markets for pollination services function well: that the
observed fees in the market reflect both the pollination value of the bees’ activities and the value
of honey produced. 
Cheung's empirical analysis of the Washington beekeeping industry sounded a caution
against the use of blackboard economics for policy analysis.  He illustrates what can be taken to
be a central point of Coase's celebrated 1960 paper: that the transactions costs of market
exchange determine the existence and extent of externalities and that to understand transactions
costs (hence externalities) one must understand the particular institutional details of the market
under consideration.  A later contribution by Olmstead and Wooten (1987) studies a particular
pollination market in a different context.  They tell the economic history of the development of
the pollination market for the alfalfa seed crop in California in the 1940s and 1950s.
In this paper, we extend and update the analysis of pollination markets by analyzing a
considerably larger and richer data set on pollination markets than the data set examined by
Cheung.  Empirical results based on several years of data are described in section III below.      
3Our data also allow us to investigate the interaction between honey subsidies and pollination
fees, a public policy topic that is analyzed in Muth et al. (2001). 
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These results support Cheung’s findings that pollination markets seem to operate efficiently.
3 
II. POLLINATION MARKETS
Pollination is an essential input in the production of numerous agricultural commodities. 
Notably, almonds, kiwifruit, tree fruit, blueberries, and various vegetables require pollination for
uniform product quality as well as enhanced yield.  Further, while honeybees have been used in
North American commercial agriculture since colonial days, their importance has grown in recent
years for at least two reasons.  First, as modern agricultural production has come to rely on large
monocropped farms, dependence for pollination on wild insects living on the periphery of fields
has become less feasible.  The purposeful pollination of crops, primarily through the use of
honeybees, is increasingly essential.  Second, wild bees have been decimated in recent years by
the twin scourges of Varroa and tracheal mites.  While both can be controlled (at a cost) by
beekeepers in domesticated colonies, feral bees have reportedly been wiped out in many areas. 
There now is less “natural” pollination to be relied upon.
In addition to providing pollination services, bees also (of course) produce honey.  The
joint production process has made honeybee pollination a favorite textbook example of
reciprocal externalities.  The joint nature of the production process also means that the study of
pollination markets contributes to an understanding of the honey commodity market.
Pollination service has been a standard example of positive externality for good reason. 
The physical facts of crop pollination imply that transactions are difficult to monitor and enforce. 
Crops require pollination for only a brief period each year and different crops and different4
altitudes and latitudes require pollination at different times.  This fact implies that there are great
economies of scale available to mobile pollinators, who use the same bees to pollinate several
crops during a crop year.  But the competitive pressure toward mobility also makes market
transactions more costly.  Combine the above with evolving scientific views of the efficacy of
honeybee pollination, and different levels of grower acceptance of the importance of bees, and
the difficulty of private contracting for pollination becomes clear.
Nevertheless, private parties do provide pollination services and markets do emerge.  In
North America, Johnson (1973) claims that the first recorded renting of colonies for pollination
occurred in 1910.  Prior to that, farmers either relied upon wild insects and the wind to pollinate
or kept bees themselves.  
Several developments led to the emergence of markets for pollination services.  Many
sources refer to the invention of the Langstroth movable-frame hive as defining the beginning of
modern beekeeping.  The Langstroth hive, invented in 1853, allowed more intensive
management of the bees and lower cost extraction of honey.
Another development important to pollination markets in North America was the
development of infrastructure that allowed bees to be moved easily.  Migratory beekeeping was
made possible by the development of the internal combustion engine and the building of a system
of roads.  The early 20
th century history of beekeeping in California included some episodes of
migratory beekeeping by rail car (see Pellett) but the important migration happened by flatbed
trucks. 
A more gradual development, but one critical to the development of pollination markets,
is the growth of knowledge about bee pollination by bees and its benefits.  Crane dates the5
fundamental science as occurring  between 1670 and 1880 (p. 473).  Knowledge grew after that
time, however, as the details of pollination requirements of particular crops came to be known. 
For example, Olmstead and Wooten tell the story of how the benefits of pollination to alfalfa
seed production came to be known in the late 1940's.  The development continues today with
active research on pollination by solitary bees.
Finally, and most recently, development of pollination markets has been spurred by
changes in the availability and quality of natural pollination.  Examples here are Varroa and
tracheal mites.  These honey bee diseases have done two things: raised the costs of commercial
beekeeping and diminished–perhaps eliminated–feral bee colonies.  The elimination of feral bee
colonies could be construed to be a rightward shift in the demand for commercial pollination
services and a spur to contracting and markets.  The increase in the costs of commercial
beekeeping also could be a force leading to developments of contracts inasmuch as they reduce
the numbers of bee colonies used to produce honey and so reduce the supply of inadvertent
pollination. 
Much of the modern market for pollination services consists of contracts between farmers
and migratory beekeepers.  In a 1994 survey of American beekeepers, Hoff and Willett found
that 22% of the surveyed beekeepers were migratory, who annually transported their bees from
37,500 to 40,000 miles.  There are several large-scale migration routes traveled by these bees. 
An important one is the route that begins with the pollination of almond trees in southern
California in March and April.  Almonds as currently grown are highly dependent on honeybee
pollination and beekeepers are paid around $40 per colony to place their bees in almond orchards
during the bloom.  Also during the early spring, the same bee colonies are put into citrus     
4 While this argument has been made in an academic context, similar arguments have been made in
the context of agricultural policy regarding beekeepers.  There it has been argued that markets
undersupply pollination services and that subsidizing honey production will generate social surplus by
increasing bee pollination.  See Muth et al. (2001).
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orchards, where the pollination benefits are not great but the nectar is plentiful for the production
of honey.   Beekeepers move their colonies north on flatbed trailers stopping to pollinate
vegetable and fruit crops along the way.  After several weeks, the migratory beekeepers arrive in
Oregon and Washington where they are paid to pollinate apples, pears, and cherries.  The
pollination fees they collect vary with the value of the honeybee pollination, the value of the
crop’s nectar in honey production, and with the prices of the crop and of honey.
After the blooming season, beekeepers find summer range for their colonies, often in the
Northern Plains states of North and South Dakota and Minnesota.  There the hives stay put and
the bees visit sunflowers, clover, basswood trees, and other nectar sources, producing honey for
consumption by the hive and extraction for sale by the beekeeper.  As winter approaches, the
bees are loaded up again, this time to winter in the south or in southern California.  A parallel
migratory route moves up the Atlantic coast, from fruit and vegetable crops in Florida to
blueberry bushes in Maine.  The markets that connect beekeepers with contracting farmers solve
remarkable problems of information gathering and processing.
III. POLLINATION EXTERNALITIES 
The argument has been made that the two-way externalities between beekeepers and
orchard owners result in inefficiencies associated with the underproduction of orchard output and
the under provision of pollination services.
4  Externalities exist because, and to the extent that,
transactions costs are high.  (See Coase.)  If it were economical for farmers and beekeepers to7
contract for pollination services, they would do so and there would be no under supply.  In fact,
pollination markets exist for many pollinated crops and so the relevant questions become: how
well do they work and how widespread are the situations where they do not?  (See Cheung.)
Pollination Markets in the Absence of Transactions Costs
As a starting point for addressing these questions, consider how markets for pollination
would work in the absence of transactions costs, hence, externalities.  Honey and fruit are the
joint outputs of a production process that employs land and bees.  The typical organization of
production involves landowners who grow crops and hire beekeepers to pollinate their crops. 
Landowners receive the output of fruit while beekeepers receive the honey.  In equilibrium, there
is a side payment (possibly negative) from landowners to beekeepers.  
To analyze the equilibrium pollination payment, consider a fictional industrial
organization which, absent transactions costs, would replicate the same payments to inputs as the
actual industry.  In the fictional story there are orchard firms that produce honey and fruit by
employing land and bee inputs, which they rent from the two classes of input owners.  The
orchard firms retain all honey and fruit output and pay beekeepers and landowners monetary
wages.
The production technology is described by two constant returns to scale production
functions.  The two outputs are assumed here to be perfectly complementary: for a given
employment of acres and bees the outputs of honey and fruit are fixed.  That honey and fruit
production follow constant returns to scale implies that the two production functions can be
written in per-acre terms:
H = FH(A,B) = A!fH(B/A), and      
5 Because the production functions are normalized on acres, the TVMPA expression appears different
from that for bees.  The interpretation of the TVMPA equation is that adding one acre yields the current
total product on a single acre adjusted for the negative effect that reducing the stocking rate has on  all
other acres.  The negative effect is due to the fact that bees must be spread more thinly and so the loss is
proportional to TVMPB.  If the two marginal products, f' H(B/A) and f' F(B/A), decrease in B/A then
TVMPB decreases and TVMPA increases in B/A.
8
F = FF(A,B) = A!fF(B/A),
where H, F, A, and B are honey, fruit, acres, and bees.  The value of the output from a firm
employing an arbitrary amount of the two inputs is:
Total value = A[PHfH(B/A) + PFfF(B/A)].
In a competitive equilibrium, orchard firms will pay each input its value marginal
product, which comprises the value marginal product from both outputs.  The equality of the total
value marginal product of bees (total refers to the sum across honey and fruit) and the
competitive wage for bees can be written as:
TVMPB = A[PHf' H(B/A) ! 1/A+PF f ' F(B/A) ! 1/A] = PHf' H (B/A) + PFf ' F(B/A) = wB,
where f' H and f' F are the per-acre marginal products with respect to the stocking rate, B/A.
The same equilibrium condition for acres of land is:
TVMPA = PHfH(B/A) + PFfF(B/A) " (B/A)[PHf' H(B/A) + PFf' F(B/A)] 
 = (total value per acre) " (B/A) ! TVMPB = wA.
In the expression for TVMPB, notice that the return from adding bees is independent of
how many acres to which the increment of bees is added.  Only the stocking rate (B/A) matters. 
The same is true of the return to adding acres.
5   
A competitive market equilibrium requires that the total value marginal products for each
of the two inputs equal their wages and, on the factor supply side, factor wages equal their     
6 Comparative static analysis of the bees and land equilibrium reveals the equilibrium dependence of
the bee and land wages on the exogenous prices of honey and fruit.  The comparative statics analysis is
found in an appendix.
The prices of fruit and honey could be endogenized, first, by substituting the inverse demand
equations PH(H) and PF(F) into the expressions for market equilibrium A and B and, second, substituting
AfH(B/A) for H and AfF(B/A) for F into the demand equations.  Paying the two inputs their value
marginal products ensures that the equilibrium prices are marginal costs.  This along with constant
returns to scale ensures zero profits for the orchard firms.
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marginal costs of supply.  The two equilibrium conditions are:
TVMPA(B/A) = wA(A), and
TVMPB(B/A) = wB(B).
The equilibrium just discussed is illustrated at the firm level in Figure 2.  The diagrams show the
equilibrium wB and B for a given A.  Not shown is the symmetric pair of diagrams depicting
equilibrium wA and A for a given B.  The left panel shows the total value marginal product of
bees, which is the vertical sum of the value marginal products in honey and fruit.  Aggregating
such TVMPB curves for all pollinated crops and across all acres cultivated, results in the market
demand curve for bees.  The equilibrium bee wage is determined in the right panel by the
intersection of the market demand for bees and the market supply of bee services.
  In the equilibrium just described, beekeepers and landowners earn rents if the industry
marginal cost curves for the factors are upward sloping.  Orchard firms earn no rents in
equilibrium because they employ constant returns to scale technology and are assumed to possess
no unique abilities.
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Now, dissolve the fictional orchard firms and consider the actual situation where
landowners own the orchards and rent the services of beekeepers.  Landowners typically pay
beekeepers, partly in kind by allowing them to keep the honey produced on their land, and partly10
by pollination fee.  The landowners retain claim to the fruit produced by the joint efforts of bees
and land.  Presumably, the fact that the standard contractual agreement makes the beekeeper the
owner of all honey produced is a result of monitoring costs.  A contract in which the orchardist
was due the honey would be more difficult to monitor than one in which the orchardist was due
only the pollination services of a fixed number of easily observed bee colonies.
The remaining analytical task is to determine a pollination fee that will replicate the
efficient equilibrium just described.  The actual contractual arrangement stipulates that
beekeepers receive honey and landowners receive fruit.  In addition, landowners pay beekeepers
a pollination fee of PP per colony (which may be negative).  To replicate the factor payments in
the fictional equilibrium, it must be that total payments to beekeepers on an acre of land—in kind







* are equilibrium values.  This equation yields the solution:
or
Figures 1 and 2 show the equilibrium payment to beekeepers per acre of land, PP(B/A), in two
situations.  The second panel shows the apparently uncommon case in which the equilibrium
payment is negative, i.e. beekeepers pay landowners for the privilege of placing their bees on the
cultivated land.  The possibility of negative pollination fees can most easily be imagined for a11
crop with little or no marginal fruit product at the equilibrium stocking rate, such as oranges.
Pollination Markets with Transactions Costs
Having seen how pollination markets would work in the absence of transactions costs,
introduce the reality of non-zero costs.  Where transactions costs are not prohibitively high, then
the same essential equilibrium as just described will occur.  Further, the contractual in-kind
payment of honey to beekeepers represents a response to certain types of transaction costs.  But
for some crops (or uncultivated situations) the costs of information, contracting, and enforcement
are higher than the benefits.  For such crops, only the value of bees in producing honey is
transmitted to the market and bees are employed only with regard to their honey production. 
Among such crops, the VMPs of bees in producing honey are forced equal, regardless of their
crop-specific pollination value.  Bees are underutilized and deadweight welfare losses arise.
There are, then, two types of beekeeping situations.  There are those where the welfare
gains from contracting are less than the transactions costs of information acquisition and
contracting.  These are markets with pollination externalities—markets in which increases in
pollination services would generate net welfare gains (ignoring the transaction costs of effecting
the increase.)  The other situations are markets in which farmers and beekeepers contract for
pollination services, transactions costs apparently being less than the gains from an optimal
provision of pollination.
In the markets with externalities, the effective demand for bee services is the value
marginal product of bees in producing honey only.  Such markets are represented in the left panel
of Figure 4,  where VMP
H
E refers to the value marginal product of bees in the production of honey12
aggregated across acres in externality markets.  The subscript E refers to externalities.  TVMPE
refers to the social value marginal product from those markets, or the aggregate of vertically
summed VMP curves in the production of honey and pollination.
In markets with pollination contracts, depicted in the middle panel of Figure 4, the
effective demand for bee services is the TVMPC curve, subscript C standing for contracts.  The
equilibrium price and quantity of bee services is found in the right panel of Figure 4.  There,
VMPE
H and TVMPC are horizontally summed to obtain the market demand curve for bee services,
DB.  Its intersection with the market supply of bee services, SB, determines an equilibrium bee
wage of w
o.  At that wage, BE
o units (colony months per month) are demanded in the markets with
externalities and BC
o units are demanded in the markets with contracts.  The aggregate quantity of




In the equilibrium just described there is an obvious inefficiency, ignoring transactions
costs.  While the net marginal social value of bee services in the markets with contracts is zero,
the net marginal social value in the markets with externalities equals the distance de, which is the
value marginal product of bees in their roles as pollinators.  There is an allocational inefficiency
in that social welfare would increase by a transfer of bees from the markets with contracts to the
markets with externalities.  After a transfer that equalized TVMP between the two types of
markets, there may be an additional adjustment in the aggregate numbers of bees that would be
welfare increasing.  
In this context, one can imagine a Pigovian subsidy schedule that would bring about a
social optimum.  It would subsidize bee placement in the markets with externalities by the
marginal schedule TVMPE " VMPE
H.  A subsidy on honey production, like the U. S. honey     
7 The question of why honey is subsidized rather than pollination services is addressed in Muth et al.  
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support program, is different from such a schedule in two important ways.
7  First, it subsidizes
only one of the two joint outputs from beekeeping.  To the extent that honey production and
pollination are not perfect complements, a honey subsidy shifts the ratio of output produced in
favor of honey production.  If the outputs are net substitutes, a subsidy on honey production will
move pollination away from the desired result.  (If this is the case, then the welfare improving
action is a honey tax.)
But assume here that honey and pollination are produced in fixed proportions.  Then the
second important way in which a honey subsidy does not resemble the Pigovian subsidy is that
the subsidy applies to both kinds of markets: ones where private and social costs diverge and
ones where contracting causes private and social costs to be equal.  A subsidy on honey, then, is
not necessarily welfare improving.  It will induce too much pollination in markets with contracts
while it generates its welfare gains in the markets with externalities.
The welfare accounting of a honey subsidy can be described with the help of Figure 3. 
Suppose that a per unit subsidy of ! is paid on the production of bee services (equivalent to a per
unit subsidy on honey because of the assumption of fixed proportions in output.)  The right panel
of Figure 4 shows that the equilibrium price of bee services will fall to w
1 while the per unit
return to beekeepers will rise to w
1+!.  Equilibrium quantities of services consumed in the two
types of markets rise to BE
1 and BC
1.
The gain to honey producers (and consumers) in the externality markets is the increase in
consumer surplus behind the derived demand for bees in the production of honey: abcd.  The
gain to orchardists in the externality markets is the incremental product of pollination services:14
edcf.  In the markets with contracts, the total gain to the honey sector and pollination demanders
is the increase in derived demand consumer surplus, hijk.
The gain to beekeepers can be seen in the right panel.  It is the increase in producer
surplus, mnop.  Taxpayer costs can also be seen in the right panel to be msrp.
The indeterminate sign of the net social welfare change can be seen by disaggregating
taxpayer costs into three components: msrp = abcg + hijl + mnqp.  The net welfare gain, then, is:
 "W  = abcd + edcf + hijk + mnop " msrp
= abcd + edcf + hijk + mnop " (abcg + hijl + mnqp)
= (abcd + edcf " abcg) + (hijk " hijl) + (mnop " mnqp)
= edgf " kjl " oqp.
The last three components of "W are readily identified and interpreted in the three panels
of Figure 4.  The possibility of net welfare gain comes from edgf, the trapezoid that nets the
consumers' component of subsidy cost from the benefits to orchardists in externality markets. 
The second component, -kjl, arises from the inefficiency induced by encouraging pollination in
markets with contracts.  The third component, -oqp, arises from the fact that the supply price of
beekeeping services is above its marginal value in the subsidized equilibrium.  There is no way,
a priori, to say if "W is positive or negative.  It will be positive if the conditions described in the
left panel predominate.
It is in situations where transactions costs are high relative to the externality loss that
subsidizing pollination can increase social surplus.  The question is: where are those situations? 
Where are the externalities?  Consider three categories of beneficiaries from honey bee
pollination: crops (including fruit), home gardens, and uncultivated areas.     
8 The issue of whether a honey subsidy encourages useful pollination is particularly appropriate in
consideration of home gardens.  It seems most unlikely that a producer attempting to maximize honey
production would place his colonies near home gardens with their low density of blossoms.
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Should we expect to find significant externalities in crop production?  This seems
unlikely in most instances.  For crops that benefit from honey bee pollination and that are grown
in large fields or orchards, full benefit from bee colonies requires their placement within the field
or orchard or on the periphery.  It is relatively easy for farmers to monitor the placement of
colonies on their own fields and any significant potential surplus should be captured through
contracting.  Evidence on this comes from the active markets for honey bee pollination services.  
Should we expect to find significant externalities in home gardens?  Perhaps. 
Transactions costs would be high to organize neighbors and contract with a beekeeper for the
placement of his bees in the neighborhood.  Free rider problems would abound.  Further, many
people, rationally or not, are afraid of bee stings and would oppose the plan.  Bee stings are, in
fact, a life-threatening hazard to some, with approximately 50 fatalities a year in the United
States.  The fear of bee stings by some would, no doubt, raise transactions costs.  But it would
also introduce a negative externality into the social calculation that is as legitimate as the
interests of gardeners seeking higher yields.  It is not clear that the obvious positive effects of
bees located in crop-producing areas would outweigh the negative effects of their increased
presence in residential areas.
8
Finally, should we expect to find significant externalities in uncultivated areas?  The
prima facie argument here suggests yes.  Uncultivated areas provide public goods: wildlife,
scenery, water filtering, and others.  Public goods are under provided privately, in general, and
augmenting plant production would increase the supply of these types of goods.  The case for the     
9 For descriptions of beekeepers' mobile lifestyle, see Whynott (1991) and Mairson (1993).
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agronomic benefits of honey bees in uncultivated areas is, however, much less well documented
than it is for cultivated crops.
In the preceding discussion of externalities, the link between a honey subsidy and the
provision of pollination services has been assumed.  But that link is not clear and the
complementarity of honey and pollination has not, to our knowledge, been measured.  Honey and
pollination can be produced in variable proportions.  Bee colonies are mobile, are regularly
transported great distances, and there is much that a beekeeper can do to redirect his colonies'
activity from one output to the other.
9  Therefore, a subsidy on one output is not equivalent to a
subsidy on both.  Nonetheless, there may be sufficient complementarity between honey and
pollination in certain situations that production of the latter is increased by a subsidy to the
former.
While honeybees produce both honey and pollination, in practice, beekeepers often use a
colony for only one commercial purpose at a time.  Effective pollination requires a higher density
of bees than does honey production.  If colonies are placed in a field to effectively pollinate, there
are so many bees relative to the food supply that they consume all the honey they produce.  The
issue is somewhat complicated by the fact that beekeepers produce several honey or pollination
"crops" in a year.  At a particular time, however, beekeepers either rent out colonies for
pollination or strategically place them for best honey production.  Therefore, a higher price of
honey may actually decrease the incentive for beekeepers to provide pollination.
The important issue is whether pollination and honey are substitute or complementary
outputs.  Arguments made in favor of the U.S. honey support program nearly always assume     
10Several additional years of data are currently being entered into computer files and will be included
in future analysis.
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complementarity.  Data on colony populations by state, however, suggest substitutability and
specialization.  Over time, bee populations have shifted from states with crops requiring
pollination to states with crops producing nectar for honey.  For example, colony numbers in
North Dakota and South Dakota, states with few crops requiring pollination, have doubled
several times in recent decades.  A 1985 U.S. General Accounting Office Report noted that, with
the exception of Florida, the states with increased colony populations grow few crops that require
supplemental pollination.  These changes cannot be attributed entirely to the honey support
program because it had very little effect on the industry until 1981.  However, the increases in
bee populations in honey producing states continued throughout the period when the honey price
support was effective.
IV. EXTENDING CHEUNG: THE EMPIRICAL DETERMINANTS OF
POLLINATION FEES 
For our empirical analysis of pollination markets, we use information from an annual
survey of Oregon and Washington beekeepers.  The survey is conducted by Professor. Michael
Burgett of the Department of Entomology at Oregon State University.  The data set we have
constructed includes information on average annual pollination fees by crop of the survey
respondents for the years 1987-1995.
10  To conduct our empirical analysis, we augment the
survey data with annual data from other sources on Oregon crop prices and Oregon honey prices. 
A straightforward empirical specification is
(1) FEEit = f (CROP PRICEit, HONEY PRICEit ),     
11 Pollination fees, crop prices, and honey prices are deflated (base year = 1991) for the empirical
analysis.
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where for crop i in year t, FEEit is the average pollination fee (in dollars per colony) reported in
the survey, CROP PRICE is the average crop price in Oregon (in dollars per pound), and
HONEY PRICE is the average price of honey received by producers in Oregon (in dollars per
pound).
11 
The expected sign of the estimated coefficient on CROP PRICE is positive—an increase
in the price of a pollinated crop increases the value marginal product of pollination services,
which should increase pollination fees.  The sign of the estimated coefficient on HONEY PRICE
provides insights into the validity of the arguments made by proponents of the honey program.  A
negative sign is consistent with the argument that an increase in honey prices increases the
number of bees available for pollination, and that this increase in supply of pollination services
leads to a reduction in pollination fees and an increase in the equilibrium quantity of pollination
services.  A positive sign suggests that an increase in honey prices causes beekeepers to shift
more of their colonies from providing pollination services to producing honey, thereby reducing
the supply of pollination services and increasing pollination fees.  The former result is consistent
with honey and pollination being complements and with the arguments made by supporters of the
honey program, whereas the latter is consistent with honey and pollination being substitutes.
Beekeepers and landowners agree on pollination fees at the time colonies are placed in
orchards and fields, typically in the spring or early summer months.  Because the fees are
determined prior to the time that actual crop prices for the year are known, fees must be based on
expectations of what crop prices will be.  Accordingly, in our empirical analysis, our simple     
12Note that we use the actual average honey price rather than the support price.  Given that there were
different support prices for different grades of honey, and given that support prices were binding during
the period of our analysis, we assume that the observed average honey price was an appropriately
weighted average of the various support prices.
     
13The survey responses do not include fee information for all of the eleven crops for every year.  Our
data set is comprised of the following: 9 observations on pears, sweet cherries, apples, cucumbers,
blueberries, and radish seed; 8 observations on vetch seed; 7 observations on crimson clover seed and
squash; and 6 observations on red clover seed and cranberries.
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proxy for the expected crop price is the crop price from the previous year.  Similarly, Oregon
honey prices for year t are determined after pollination fees are specified.  In the presence of the
honey price support program, however, each year’s honey price support level was known at the
time that pollination fees were specified.  Accordingly, to account for the presence of the honey
program during a portion of the period of our analysis, we use the honey price for year t when the
program was in effect (until 1993) and thereafter, we use the honey price in year t"1 as a proxy
for the expected honey price at the time pollination fees were specified in year t.
12
The data set we use for our empirical analysis includes 88 observations on crop-average
pollination fees from the surveys.  The data span the years 1987–1995 and include information
on eleven crops.
13   
An obvious problem with the specification in equation (1) arises from the cross section-
time series nature of our pollination fee data set.  The dependent variable, FEEit, is measured in
dollars per colony, whereas the units for crop prices and honey prices are dollars per pound. 
Because of differences in crop yields and bee colony placement densities, there is no reason to
believe that a given change in crop prices will have the same effect on pollination fees for all
crops.  Similarly, because of differences in the characteristics and volume of honey produced
from different crops, there is no reason to believe that a given change in the price of honey will     
14Here, DISCOUNT is a unitless measure of the proportionate discount or premium in the price of
honey from the ith crop relative to the price of honey from some base crop.
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have the same effects on fees for all crops.  A semi-log empirical specification that accounts for
these effects is:
(2)
The transformation for crop prices adjusts for crop yields and bee colony placement densities,
while the transformation for honey prices adjusts for honey quality and honey yield per colony. 
Crop dummies (0"1 variables) are included to account for any additional fixed effects across
crops.  It can be seen that the units of the adjusted crop price are $/colony =
[($/lb)(lb/acre)]/(colonies/acre).  Similarly, the units of the adjusted honey price are $/colony =
$/lb!lb/colony.
14  Noting that two of the three terms in the expressions for both the adjusted crop
and honey prices vary only across crops, equation (2) can be rewritten as 
(3) FEEit = #0 + #1ln(CROP PRICEit!ki ) + #2ln(HONEY PRICEt!mi) 
  + #3CROP DUMMYi + $it.
        = #0 + #1ln(CROP PRICEit) + #2ln(HONEY PRICEt) 
+ (#1lnki + #2lnmi +  #3CROP DUMMYi ) + $it.
        = #0 + #1ln(CROP PRICEit) + #2ln(HONEY PRICEt) + #3
* Di + $it,     
15The squash dummy variable is omitted.
     
16The only three crop dummy variables whose estimated coefficients are significantly different from
zero are those for red and crimson clover seed and vetch seed.  The estimated coefficients for all three of
these are negative.
     
17Crops that are designated as honey producing crops were vegetable seed, red clover seed, crimson
clover seed, vetch seed, raspberries, blueberries, and radish seed.
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where Di is a crop specific dummy variable that subsumes the impacts of the separate
crop-specific effects listed above.
OLS estimates of equation (3) and variants are presented in table 1.  Regression 1
includes the crop price, the price of honey, and ten individual 0"1 crop dummy variables.
15 
Although the estimated coefficient on the crop price is positive, it is not significantly different
from zero.  The estimated coefficient on the honey price is negative and significant, which
supports the pro-honey price support argument that an increase in the price of honey increases the
availability of pollination services, thereby driving down pollination fees.  The crop dummy
variables are jointly significant.
16
With a full set of crop dummies, the crop price variable represents only the effects from
time series price variation.  It cannot represent the possible effects of inter-crop variation in
value.  To examine such an effect, regression 2 replaces the individual crop dummy variables
with a 0"1 dummy variable that is assigned a value of one if honey typically is produced when
colonies are placed with the crop.
17  Because revenues are obtained from the honey produced, the
fees charged for placing colonies with these crops are predicted to be less than for crops that
yield no income to the beekeeper.  Thus, we predict a negative estimated coefficient for the
HONEY CROP variable.  As can be seen from table 1, this prediction is borne out by the highly
significant coefficient on this variable.  Further, the estimated coefficient on the CROP PRICE22
variable becomes positive and significant and the coefficient on the HONEY PRICE remains
negative and significant.  The coefficient on the HONEY CROP variable suggests that the
pollination fee for crops that produce honey is about $17 per colony less than for crops that
produce no honey.  The results also suggest that a ten percent increase in average honey prices
causes a decrease in pollination fees of about $2.50 per colony and that a ten percent increase in
crop prices causes pollination fees to increase by about $.40 per colony.
In our data set, the price of honey is constant across all crops for each year.  Because of
this structure, it is conceivable that the honey price variable is picking up the effects of other
(non-honey price) factors that vary yearly.  If so, then the effects of other factors are confounding
our estimates of the impacts of changes in crop prices on pollination fees.  Regression 3 accounts
for this possible source of bias by replacing the honey price variable in Regression 2 with annual
0"1 year dummy variables.  As can be seen, the year dummy variables are jointly significant. 
Further, neither the crop price nor the honey crop variable is much affected—either in terms of
statistical significance or the value of the estimated coefficient.
Another measurable factor that should influence pollination fees is related to the impacts
of honeybees on crop output.  The more reliant a crop’s output is on pollination by honeybees,
the greater will be the value of a colony of bees.  For a subset of the crops in our sample, we
obtained an index of pollination from Robinson, et al. as a proxy for this factor.  The inclusion of
this variable reduces our data sample from 88 to 58 observations.  Regression 4 in table 1 has the
same specification as Regression 2 and is presented to indicate the impacts of the change in
sample size (as distinct from the introduction of the pollination index).   The results of the two
regressions are substantively the same in terms of statistical significance (although the magnitude23
of the coefficients is altered somewhat).    Regression 5 includes the index of pollination.  The
estimated coefficient on this variable is positive as predicted and significant at the .10 level.  The
estimated coefficients on the other three variables remain statistically significant with the same
signs.
The empirical results presented in table 1 support the notion, first developed by Cheung,
that there is a well-developed market for beekeepers’ services.  As predicted by a competitive
model, increases in crop prices and in the productivity of honey bees tend to increase pollination
fees, and pollination fees for honey crops are less than for crops that do not yield marketable
honey to beekeepers.  Finally, our results suggest that an increase in honey prices results in a
reduction in pollination fees—a finding that is consistent with arguments made by proponents of
the honey program.  Our empirical results support Cheung's earlier findings and extend his work,
both in terms of econometric methodology and richness of the data analyzed.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Despite the importance of honeybee pollination for many agricultural crops, there has
been little economic analysis of pollination markets.  In this paper, we extend Cheung’s three-
decade-old treatment of pollination markets in several ways.  First, we discuss some of the
historical institutional developments that made possible the pollination markets studied by
Cheung and discuss the effects of recent events related to bee disease.  Second, we discuss the
particular instance of the theory of the second best provided by the simultaneous existence of
pollination markets and pollination externalities.  In this context, we present a model of welfare
analysis taking into account transaction costs. which we use to analyze the welfare effects of a24
subsidy on the production of honey.  Third, we extend Cheung’s empirical work by focusing on
pollination markets that appear to work well and testing the predictions of an economic model of
such markets.  The empirical analysis we present, based on annual surveys of Oregon and
Washington beekeepers, suggests that pollination markets are efficient in the sense that
pollination fees respond in predictable ways to changes in a variety of economic factors.  
Planned extensions to the current work are two.  The first is a more disaggregated
analysis–at the individual beekeeper level–of the pollination survey data to measure the
determinants of pollination fees.  The second is a historical study of the rise of pollination
markets: the process of institutional evolution that transforms situations involving externalities
into situations in which potential gains from trade have been captured through contracts.25
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Table 1.  Regression Results:  Determinants of Pollination Fees
Dependent variable:  Pollination Fee ($/colony).
Variable















































Pollination Index — — — — 9.42
(1.34)*
Crop Dummy Variables
# 33.20** — — — —
Year Dummy Variables
# — — 2.51** — —
F Value 31.75 29.92 11.52 6.34 5.27
Adjusted R
2 0.809 0.499 0.547 0.219 0.231
No. of observations 88 88 88 58 58
**Significant at 0.05 level; * significant at 0.10 level (one-tailed test significance for Crop Price, Honey Crop, and Pollination Index; two-tailed for others).
# Number displayed is value of F-statistic for joint significance of the respective groups of dummy variables.282930
Appendix:
The Comparative Statics of the Fictional Organization of Industry
First, rewrite the equilibrium conditions in terms of the honey and fruit production functions:
where b=B/A, the per-acre stocking rate of bees, and fH and fF and their derivatives are understood to
depend upon b.
The differentials of the system can be written as:
where
The solution for equilibrium changes in acres and bees is:
where
     
The dependence of the wage for bees on the price of the fruit output can be determined by substituting
the reduced form solution for dB/dPF into wB(B):
The comparative static derivative is positive if f' F, the marginal product of the stocking rate in fruit
production, is positive.  An easily interpretable special case of the above occurs when the supply of
acres to fruit production is perfectly elastic:
In this last situation, where a change in the price of fruit can  cause no change in the price of land, the
change in the bee wage is its marginal product in fruit production divided by the stocking rate.
Note that for equilibrium solutions involving positive employment of bees, wB = PFf' F + PHf' H >
0.  However, it may be the case that the marginal product of bees in one of the outputs, either f' H or f' F,
is negative.